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COVER STORY

When the
Case Gives
You Lemons …
By Michael J. Higdon

Using Negative
Authority in
Persuasive
Legal Writing

For legal advocates, dealing with adverse case law can often be an
extremely vexing experience. By “adverse,” I mean cases that, to
some extent or another, cast doubt on the ultimate argument the
lawyer is hoping to advance. When these “bad” cases come along —
and they frequently do — the lawyer must ask herself two difficult
questions: 1) should she include the negative authority and 2) if so,
how and to what extent.
The answer to the first question is in most instances going to be
an emphatic “yes,” partly because of the lawyer’s ethical duty, but
more germane to the point of this article, because negative case law
can actually improve advocacy. Now, it may sound somewhat fanciful
to suggest that including adverse authorities in a brief can ultimately
make a legal argument more persuasive. The fact is, however, that
proper incorporation of such authority can elevate both the perceived
credibility of the legal writer and as the overall strength of the
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writer’s position. Such a conclusion is
supported not only by studies involving
legal writing, but also by basic tenets of
cognitive psychology.
The purpose then of this article is
two-fold: first, to point out why an
attorney, for both ethical and persuasive
reasons, should include contrary case
law, and second, to discuss concrete
ways in which attorneys can incorporate
such authorities for maximum benefit in
legal advocacy.

To Include or Not to Include …
As a preliminary matter, this article
would be remiss if it failed to point out
the ethical rules concerning a lawyer’s
duty to include negative authority.
Specifically, the Rule of Professional
Conduct 3.3 states that “a lawyer shall
not knowingly … fail to disclose to the
tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to
be directly adverse to the position of the
client and not disclosed by opposing
counsel.”1 So what exactly does this
language mean? Well, according to
some, the answer is “not much.”
Indeed, Rule 3.3 fails to clarify what
is meant by “directly adverse.” This
omission raises many questions as to
what exactly an attorney must disclose.
As one legal writing scholar has
described: “The language could arguably
be interpreted to require an attorney to
disclose even clearly distinguishable
adverse authority that nonetheless
offered importance guidance to the court
through analogy, dictum or general
reasoning. In contrast, a narrow interpretation may require an attorney to
disclose only authority that is squarely
on point.”2 Because the rule, however,
further modifies “directly adverse” with
the language “known to the lawyer,” the
rule allows an attorney to make a
subjective determination of whether any
given authority falls within the ambit of
the rule. Given then that almost any case
can be distinguished on some basis,
some have criticized Rule 3.3 as being
“so narrow as to be wholly ineffectual.”3
Even in the absence of an ethical
duty to do so, however, there are still
MARCH2010

good reasons that a lawyer might decide
nonetheless to disclose negative
authority. First off, either your opponent
or the judge is likely to find the same
negative authority and, once that
happens, the fact that you failed to
include the case can be quite damaging.
At best, such an omission will lead the
court to think that you are a poor
researcher. At worst, the court will
conclude that you were trying to hide
something. Furthermore, including such
an authority can have quite a positive
impact on an attorney’s reputation. Just
as a political message becomes more
credible the more highly regarded the
politician is, so too does an attorney’s
argument gain strength based on the
perceived character of the attorney who
is making the argument. Disclosing
adverse authority is, then, one way
attorneys can increase a court’s perception of their character. As one judge has
pointed out, “nothing is more impressive than the advocate who comes into
court” and presents not only positive
cases, but also those that are not so
positive.4 In fact, one court has gone so
far as to praise an attorney for
informing the court of a potentially
harmful case: “Normally we do not
compliment counsel for being ethical;
however, compliance with [Rule 3.3], in
our experience, has been the exception
rather than the rule.”5

The Persuasive Impact of
Including Adverse Authority
Beyond helping the lawyer’s reputation,
Illinois Judge Mark Drummond also
notes the positive persuasive impact that
the disclosure of negative authorities can
have on the lawyer’s argument. As Judge
Drummond explains, “It appears that you
are less concerned about [the negative
authority] when you admit its existence
— and it is even more devastating for the
other side when you cite cases that are
against you that they have not found.”6
Indeed, bringing up negative authority in
advance of your opponent can be quite
damaging to your opponent’s argument in
that doing so “permits taking the wind
Continued on page 16
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out of an opponent’s sails.”7 In the field of
cognitive psychology, the theory that
describes this phenomenon is known as
inoculation theory.
Indeed, where an author can predict
resistance to a particular message, such
resistance can be preempted through
inoculation. In essence, “Inoculation
theory asserts that people can resist attitude change if they are trained to
consciously generate responses to anticipated persuasive messages targeting a
particular attitude or value.”8 As
Professor Kathryn Stanchi explains:
The theory of inoculation is based
on the idea that advocates can make
the recipient of a persuasive message
“resistant” to opposing arguments,
much like a vaccination makes a
patient resistant to disease. In an
inoculation message, the message
recipient is exposed to a weakened
version of arguments against the
persuasive message coupled with
appropriate refutation of those
opposing arguments. The theory is
that introducing a “small dose” of
message contrary to the persuader’s
position makes the message recipient
immune to attacks from the opposing
side.9
For instance, consider one of the
events that led to the development of this
theory. Specifically, during the Korean
War, American prisoners were persuaded
to cooperate with the enemy, not through
physical intimidation, but through indoctrination. This was so because the
Americans had never before really questioned their patriotism and American
values. As such, the prisoners lacked
immunity to counterarguments and were
thus more susceptible to influence.10
Thus, employing Inoculation Theory
in legal advocacy, whereby an advocate
raises and refutes a contrary argument
in advance of his opponent, can make
it that much harder for the opponent
to rely on that argument. In essence,
the reader has already been “inoculated” to resist this argument.
16 |
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Furthermore, by making this preemptive strike, your opponent is now
forced into a defensive posture should
he subsequently decide to try and
press the argument you have attempted
to refute. As noted below, defensive
arguments are inherently weaker than
affirmative, offensive arguments.

Writing Techniques for Including
Negative Cases
The better course of action for an advocate, then, is to affirmatively point out
negative case law and, at the same time,
point out why that case is inapposite to
the case currently before the court. But
how exactly does an attorney do that?
Well, there are two steps. First the
lawyer must find a way to distinguish
the case and, second, he must frame
the case in such a way that the case is
included as affirmative support for the
attorney’s position and not merely as a
defensive strike born out of fear of an
expected attack. This section details
exactly how an attorney can successfully navigate each of those two steps.

Distinguishing a Case
Learning how to distinguish a case is as
simple as comparing cats and dogs. In
fact, when I first introduce law students
to the process of distinguishing cases, I
ask them to first envision a cat and dog
and then tell me how the two are alike
and how they are different. When it
comes to similarities, typical responses
include: “both are mammals,” “both
have four legs,” and “both are kept as
pets.” In terms of differences, students
provide answers like: “cats have
retractable claws,” “dogs come in a
wider array of sizes than cats,” and, my
personal favorite, “cats bury their
poop.” Having made this list of similarities and differences, I then ask the
students to compare the two lists.
When they do so, they begin to see that
they found similarities by focusing on
more general categorizations (e.g.,
“both cats and dogs inhabit the planet
earth”), while they identified differences
by looking at more specific attributes of
cats and dogs (e.g., “cats have 38 chro-

mosomes, while dogs have 78”). The
lesson in all this: if you want to argue
that two things are alike, use a fairly
general level of abstraction; to argue
they are different, get more specific.
We see this principle employed all
the time in the law. For example, there
are numerous judicial opinions where
the majority and the dissent disagree
simply because one is reading a precedent case broadly while the other is
focusing on a more specific reading of
the case. For instance, the Eleventh
Circuit, in Williams v. Attorney Gen. of
Ala. upheld Alabama’s criminal statute
that bans the sale of “sex toys.”11 Those
who challenged the statute did so by
relying on the Supreme Court’s decision
in Lawrence v. Texas,12 which ruled
unconstitutional a Texas law that criminalized homosexual sodomy.
Nonetheless, the Eleventh Circuit in
Williams rejected this argument, noting
that “although Lawrence clearly established the unconstitutionality of criminal prohibitions on consensual adult
sodomy, ‘it is a strained and ultimately
incorrect reading of Lawrence to interpret it to announce a new fundamental
right’ … to all forms of sexual intimacy.”13 The dissent, in contrast, argued
that “[i]n validating the sodomy statute
at issue in Lawrence, the Court reaffirmed this [substantive due process]
right to sexual privacy.”14 As this
example from Williams points out, the
dissent, which was trying to include the
present case within the framework of
Lawrence, did so by framing Lawrence
generally (i.e., establishing a right to
sexual privacy). The majority, on the
other hand, framed Lawrence in a much
more specific way (i.e., consensual adult
sodomy), to distinguish that case from
the one it was then ruling on.
The lesson, then, for attorneys trying
to distinguish an unfavorable case is to
focus on the specific aspects of the case,
framing it so specifically that it appears
to exclude cases such as the one they
are currently advocating. Likewise,
when hoping to ultimately argue that a
client’s case is sufficiently similar to a
favorable case as to require the same
MARCH2010

outcome, they should frame the case in
general enough terms so as to encompass the facts of their client’s case.

Taking the Offensive
Once an attorney seizes upon a way to
distinguish an unfavorable case, the
only question remaining is how best to
go about drafting the discussion of that
case. Indeed, given the fact that courts
rely on past cases when deciding a new
dispute, the way in which an attorney
frames those cases can be crucial. Many
attorneys unfortunately choose to take
a very defensive tact when wording the
case in question. Typical examples will
often include constructions that begin
with such language as “Although my
opponent may attempt to rely on Case
X, this case is not applicable because
…” or, more directly, “Case X has no
bearing on my case because X.” The
problem with constructions such as
these is two-fold. First, it puts the
attorney in a very defensive posture,
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giving the impression that she is afraid
of this “bad” case. Second, it draws too
much attention to your opponent’s
argument. By essentially repeating the
anticipated argument of your opponent,
you are reminding the court of that
very argument, regardless of whether
you eventually explain why that argument is inapposite. What the attorney
should do is take an offensive
approach, presenting the negative case
in a way that, instead of simply
rehashing what opposing counsel is
likely to argue, affirmatively advances
your own argument.
To do that, I encourage attorneys to
begin with the following formula. For a
negative case, let “A” represent the
result that the court reached in that case
(i.e., the result you do not want the
court to reach in your case).
Furthermore, let “X” represent the
specific attributes of that case that you
intend to focus on so as to ultimately
distinguish your case from the prece-

dent case (using the method described
infra). Having defined X and A, you can
now begin to craft your discussion of
the negative case. To do so, start off
with the following sentence: “Only in
the limited circumstance of X has the
Court ruled A. For example, in [name
of negative case] …” As you can see, in
following this basic construction, you
will affirmatively make the point that,
yes, the court has reached a result other
than the one you are advocating, thus
fulfilling any ethical duty you may have
and also building your reputation with
the court as being a credible, forthright
attorney. At the same time, by introducing the case using such limiting
language, you also communicate that
such contrary results are limited to cases
involving very different circumstances.
Thus, you begin to foreshadow to the
court how and why this case is inapplicable, a conclusion that is only
bolstered when you ultimately point out
Continued on page 18

TENNESSEEBARJOURNAL

| 17

Using Negative Authority
continued from page 17

that your client’s case is missing the allimportant “X” factor.
On the flip side, suppose you are
drafting a case description of a favorable
case. In that case, let “B” represent the
result that was reached in the positive
case (i.e., the result you want the current
court to reach) and let “Y” represent what
that case has in common with your
client’s case. With those two variables in
place, you can then draft a case description that essentially says, “Whenever Y,
the court has ruled B.” In so doing, when
you later reveal that your client’s case
also includes “Y,” your argument that the
court should reach a result in your case
similar to the one it reached in the precedent case is much more compelling.
Of course, none of this discussion is
to suggest that legal writing should be
formulaic or even that this exact wording
should always be used; these constructions are instead offered as ways to start

thinking about and framing the precedent cases so as ultimately to support
stronger arguments on the basis of those
cases and the present case.

Conclusion
In sum, the presence of adverse case
law should not be taken as cause for
alarm, but should be seen as an opportunity for advocacy. Indeed, instead of
simply ignoring such cases, embrace
them. To ignore a negative case (in
addition to possibly violating the rules
of professional conduct) is to bestow
upon your opponent the privilege of
being the first to bring the case to the
court’s attention — and you can be sure
that your opponent will not be bringing
up that case in a way that is favorable
to you. Instead, affirmatively work the
“bad” case into your own argument. In
so doing, you achieve two benefits: 1)
you insure that the first time the court
hears of this case, it also hears how the
case is inapposite to your position; and
2) at the same time, you “inoculate” the
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court, making it that much harder for
your opponent to argue a contrary
position. In other words, as the old
Mexican proverb advises, “He who
strikes first, strikes twice.”
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